I. INTRODUCTION
In Taylor v. Illinois,1 a majority of the United States Supreme Court determined that the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment 2 was not violated by the preclusion of a witness's testimony as a sanction for the violation of discovery rules. 3 The Court affirmed an Illinois Appellate Court decision 4 that upheld the trial court's exclusion of the testimony. 5 In reaching this conclusion the Court ostensibly declined to establish a set standard for when discovery violations warranted such an extreme sanction, instead promoting a balancing of the interests involved. 6 These interests include the defendant's right to present testimony as guaranteed by the compulsory process clause and the state's interest in orderly, fair, and accurate criminal trials. 7 In deciding Taylor, however, the Court failed to actually apply such a balancing test. Instead, it established a standard for the discretionary use of preclusion when a willful violation of discovery rules exists. 8 This Note reviews the Taylor opinion and concludes that the Court failed to properly define or consider all the important factors to be balanced. Additionally, the Court's willful violation As an explanation for the late production of the new names, defense counsel told the court that the defendant had actually informed him of these witneses earlier, but that the defendant could not locate Wormley. 20 The court noted that counsel should have supplied the names earlier even if the addresses were unknown and also expressed concern as to whether the witnesses were actually present during the incident. 2 ' The judge then directed that the two additional witnesses be brought into court the next day at which time he would rule on the admissibility of their testimony. 2 2 The following day the judge discussed the ramifications of violating discovery rules, but allowed defense counsel to make an offer of proof by presenting Wormley's testimony while the jury was removed. 23 Wormley testified that he had not witnessed the confrontation itself, but that he had seen Bridges and his brother carrying two guns under a blanket and heard them say they were after Taylor and his friends. 24 Wormley further testified that he later saw Taylor's group and warned them that the Bridges' group was armed. 25 Upon cross-examination Wormley revealed that he had met Taylor about four months prior to that day, approximately two years after the incident, and that defense counsel had visited him at his home the week before the trial began. Based upon Wormley's testimony, the trial judge decided that the exclusion of his testimony was an appropriate sanction for the discovery violation. 27 The judge stated that it was a willful and blatant violation of the rules of discovery and that he doubted the veracity of Wormley's testimony. 2 8 Furthermore, the judge noted a pattern of blatant discovery violations in the last three or four cases in his courtroom and expressed his desire to put a stop to that pattern. 29 Taylor 28 Id. At the trial court level, the only objection to the preclusion of Wormley's testimony came in Taylor's "motion for new trial, stating '[t] he Court erred by not letting a witness for defendant testify before the jury.'" Id. at 658 (quoting Record at 412). 
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The Appellate Court ruled that the severity of a sanction imposed against a party for the violation of a rule of discovery was within the discretion of the trial court and that the preclusion of Wormley's testimony was within that discretion. 3 ' The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. 3 2 The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider whether the preclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for the infraction of a pretrial discovery rule violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process. 3 3 III. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A.
MAJORITY OPINION Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion affirming Taylor's conviction by a five-to-three vote. 34 Justice Stevens first determined that a discovery sanction that precludes a defense witness from testifying may violate the defendant's sixth amendment compulsory process clause rights, which confers on the accused the right to subpoena witnesses and the right to present witnesses in his own defense. 3 5 The Court held that this sixth amendment right to present witnesses, however, is not absolute and the discovery sanction of preclusion is justified when a discovery violation is willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage or to conceal a plan to present fabricated testimony. Justice Stevens began his analysis by examining the nature of the right to present witnesses and the role of the compulsory process clause in protecting that right. 3 7 He reasoned that the compulsory process clause's "right to compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard. '38 The Court noted that the State's contention that the compulsory 31 Id. The Appellate Court noted that the only witness preclusion issue before it was whether "the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of a defense witness as a sanction for violation of the discovery rules." Id. at 839, 491 N.E.2d at 4-5. The Appellate Court did not, however address either the compulsory process claim implied in the briefs, or the due process claim expressly asserted in the briefs concerning witness preclusion. 
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process clause had no role in supporting this right or in determining the constitutionality of the infringement of this right by a discovery sanction was "supported by the plain language of the [compulsory process] Clause, 3 9 ... by the historical evidence that it was intended to provide defendants with subpoena power that they lacked at common law, 40 by some scholarly comment, 4 1 and by a brief excerpt from the legislative history of the Clause." 4 2 Justice Stevens then noted, however, that the Court had consistently interpreted the compulsory process clause in a broader manner more in line with state constitutional provisions which legislatures had drafted during the same time period and gave the defendant the right to present evidence advantageous to his defense.
3
Justice Stevens stated that " '[o]ur cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before ajury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.' "44 Justice Stevens characterized previous Supreme Court cases as establishing that "[flew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present his own defense" 4 5 and that such a right "is an essential attribute of the adversary system itself." 46 Because of this important role, Justice Stevens reasoned that the right to "compel a witness' presence in the courtroom could not protect the integrity of the adversary process if it did not embrace the right to have the witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact," 4 7 and therefore the right to offer testimony can be implicitly found in the sixth amendment. 
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The Court next addressed Taylor's contention that the compulsory process clause created an absolute bar to the preclusion of defense evidence as a sanction for the violation of a discovery rule and concluded that it was "just as extreme and just as unacceptable as the State's position that the Amendment is simply irrelevant. The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." 4 9 In reaching that conclusion, the Court differentiated several rights protected by the sixth amendment. 50 Justice Stevens first noted that while the privileges of most sixth amendment rights were automatically bestowed on a defendant in order to protect him from prosecutorial abuses, the "right to compel the presence and present the testimony of witnesses .... may be employed to rebut the prosecution's case. The decision whether to employ it in a particular case rests solely with the defendant." 5 1
Justice Stevens further explained that the principle underlying the right to present evidence was also the source of necessary limitations on that right. 5 2 He stressed that "[t]he adversary process could not function effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the opponent's case." 53 Furthermore, Justice Stevens continued, absolute control of the presentation of witnesses' testimony by either party would seriously undermine the entire trial process. 54 Toward that end, he said, the State is justified in imposing and enforcing rules of evidence that control the identification and presentation of witnesses. 55 The Court determined that the defendant's right to compulsory process was intended to "vindicate the principle that the 'ends of criminal justice would be defeated ifjudgments were to be founded which it was determined that the right to present a defense consisted of the right to compel the attendance of witnesses and offer their testimony and that such a right "'stands on no lesser footing than other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the states.'" Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 652-653 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967)). 49 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 653. Taylor had argued that preclusion was too drastic a sanction to ever be imposed for failure to include a witness on a pretrial list, because other less drastic sanctions are available for violations of pretrial discovery rules. 63 Such sanctions could be imposed against either the defendant or defense counsel, and prejudice to the prosecution could be limited by allowing a continuance or mistrial to allow further time for investigation of the proposed witness. 
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nonetheless, be less effective than preclusion and there would be instances in which these alternative sanctions would fail to properly protect the state interest protected by discovery rules. 6 5 Justice Stevens described one such instance to be the attempted use of fabricated testimony through a series of discovery rule violations.
66
In such a case, he said, "[i]f a pattern of discovery violations is explicable only on the assumption that the violations were designed to conceal a plan to present fabricated testimony, it would be entirely appropriate to exclude the tainted evidence regardless of whether other sanctions would also be merited. 6 7 In declining to establish a comprehensive set of standards to control the proper use of discretion in such cases, the Court emphasized the defendant's basic right to present testimony. 68 However, the Court continued, "mere invocation of that right cannot automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests." The countervailing public interests considered by Justice Stevens were the "integrity of the adversary process," " the interest in the fair and efficient administration ofjustice," and "the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process." 7 0
Justice Stevens stated that when a trial judge learns that a failure to disclose all witnesses prior to trial "was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage . . . it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the Confrontation Clause simply to exclude the witness' testimony.
71
In rejecting Taylor's assertion that preclusion is an inappropriate sanction regardless of the severity of the discovery violation, Justice Stevens concluded that "[i]t would demean the high purpose of the Compulsory Process Clause to construe it as encompassing an absolute right to an automatic continuance or mistrial to allow pre- 71 Id. at 655-656. The Court acknowledged that while there may be legitimate reasons for not wishing to disclose a witness' name, such concerns should be raised prior to trial. Additionally, the Court stated that there was no indication that Taylor had objected to the discovery request on any grounds. Id. at 656 n.20. The Court further noted that the difficulty or "simplicity of compliance with the discovery rule [was] also relevant." Id. at 656. Because the invocation of the compulsory process clause by the defendant already requires planning and affirmative actions by the defendant and defense counsel, including locating, interrogating, and serving subpoenas upon witnesses, identifying them in advance does not require much additional effort. Id.
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sumptively perjured testimony to be presented to a jury. 7 2 In rejecting Taylor's argument that te preclusion of Wormley's testimony was unnecessarily harsh, Justice Stevens looked past any potential prejudice that might have occurred to the prosecution if the court had permitted Wormley to testify. 73 Justice Stevens expressed a concern for "the impact of this kind of conduct on the integrity of the judicial process itself." 74 The Court agreed with the trial judge that this was a case of willful misconduct, and that the defense counsel had attempted to gain a tactical advantage through violation of the discovery rules. 7 5 The Court justified the preclusion sanction both on the grounds that, generally, categories of inadmissible evidence may properly be excluded by the rules of evidence even though the particular testimony offered may not be prejudicial and, specifically, that enough doubts were raised by the record to question Wormley's veracity. The Court then addressed Taylor's argument that he should not be punished for his attorney's mistakes because the preclusion of favorable testimony was not actually a sanction against the lawyer who violated the discovery rules, but only served to penalize Taylor by hurting his chances for acquittal. 7 7 The Court stated that a lawyer must have full authority to speak for his client at trial in order to preserve the adversarial system and that in such situations Taylor must accept his attorney's decisions in managing the trial, with the exception of cases in which counsel is ineffective. 78 Furthermore, requiring a determination of the relative culpability of the lawyer and the defendant prior to the sanction of preclusion would require extensive investigation that would be "highly impracticable. 75 Id. The Court placed emphasis on the fact that defense counsel had actually interviewed Wormley one week prior to the trial, did not identify Wormley in the amended Answer to Discovery on the first day of the trial, and identified but failed to place on the stand two actual eyewitnesses. Id. The Court also noted that the trial court was concerned about discovery violations in previous cases. Justice Stevens acknowledged that this was an appropriate concern only if Taylor's attorney had been involved in these previous violations. Otherwise, this was an improper consideration for justifying an infringement upon Taylor's constitutional right to present a defense. Id.
76 Id. at 657. The Court noted that "[t]he pretrial conduct revealed by the record in this case gives rise to a sufficiently strong inference 'that witnesses are being found that really weren't there,' to justify the sanction of preclusion." Id. (quoting Record at 13-14). 
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843 SUPREME COURT REVIEW B. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENTING OPINION Justice Brennan dissented from the majority opinion 8 0 and argued that when there is no evidence of the defendant's involvement in a discovery rule violation, "the Compulsory Process Clause per se bars discovery sanctions that exclude criminal defense evidence." 8 ' Justice Brennan thought that the question in this case was I"not whether discovery rules should be enforced but whether the need to correct and deter discovery violations requires a sanction that itself distorts the truthseeking process by excluding material evidence of innocence in a criminal case." 82 The dissent agreed with the majority opinion that Taylor's constitutional claims were not waived in the Appellate Court of Illinois. 83 Justice Brennan did not agree, however, that these claims were properly preserved at trial and concluded that Taylor had waived his constitutional rights as a matter of Illinois law. 8 4 Justice Brennan noted that Taylor had only claimed at the trial court level that the court erred in precluding Wormley's testimony. 8 5 Justice Brennan argued that the Appellate Court of Illinois, in a previous case, 8 6 had already held that the claim that the court erred preserved only an abuse of discretion claim and waived any constitutional claims. 8 7 However, Justice Brennan continued, the Illinois Appellate Court's determination that federal constitutional claims were waived as a matter of Illinois state law does not mean that they are waived as a matter of federal law. 88 80 Id. at 657. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun in dissent.
81 Id. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 82 Id. at 657-658 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 83 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan agreed with this conclusion based on his opinion that Taylor's appellate brief properly presented the compulsory process clause claim and the fact that the analysis regarding Taylor's claims "would essentially be the same under the due process clause." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan later noted that both the compulsory process clause and the due process clause "require courts to conduct a searching substantive inquiry whenever the government seeks to exclude criminal defense evidence." Id. at 660 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 31 and accompanying text for further discussion of the Illinois Appellate Court decision.
8. 4 Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see supra note 28 for the objection that Taylor raised at trial.
85 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 86 People v. Douthit, 51 Ill. App. 3d 751, 366 N.E.2d 950 (1977)(claim that court erred in precluding defense witness testimony "raises only the nonconstitutional question whether the trial court abused its discretion in exercising the exclusion").
87 Taylor, 108 S. Ct. at 658 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 88 Id. at 659 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that "it is well established that where a state court possesses the power to disregard a procedural default in exceptional cases, the state court's failure to exercise that power in a particular case does
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Justice Brennan then considered the merits of the case itself. Starting from the premise that the compulsory process clause grants the defendant a substantive right to present exculpatory evidence, Justice Brennan stated his agreement with the part of the majority opinion that rejected the State's argument that the compulsory process clause only granted the power to subpoena witnesses. 8 9 However, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority that the plain language of the compulsory process clause supported the state's position. 90 Justice Brennan argued that such an interpretation would result in making the subpoena power meaningless if subpoenaed defense witnesses were not allowed to testify. Justice Brennan asserted that the compulsory process clause and the due process clause require the courts to conduct a substantive inquiry whenever an attempt is made to exclude defense evidence, 9 2 because the exclusion of such evidence "undermines the central truthseeking aim of our criminal justice system because it deliberately distorts the record at the risk of misleading the jury into convicting an innocent person." 9 3 Justice Brennan recognized, however, that there still existed valid restrictions on the presentation of evidence that are not made unconstitutional under the compulsory process clause. 
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845 SUPREME COURT REVIEW Arkansas 9 6 that restrictions on the right to present evidence can be constitutional only if they " 'accomodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process' and are not 'arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.' -97
Justice Brennan then reviewed the present case using the standard announced in Rock, framing the issue as "whether precluding a criminal defense witness from testifying bears an arbitrary and disproportionate relation to the purposes of discovery." 98 Justice Brennan began this part of his analysis by noting that discovery helps to "develop a full account of the relevant facts, helps detect and expose attempts to falsify evidence, and prevents factors such as surprise" from deciding the ultimate outcome of a case. 9 9 Justice Brennan maintained that these goals are met by compliance with the rules, not exclusion of evidence. 0 0 Therefore, discovery sanctions should serve to meet these same goals by "correcting for the adverse effects of discovery violations and deterring future discovery violations from occuring."' 0 ' As a result, Justice Brennan argued that sanctions which meet these goals and do not purposely distort the fact-finding process, as preclusion does, should be used. offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability' " also held unconstitutional); and Washington, 388 U.S. at 23 ("rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief" are unconstitutional Justice Brennan maintained that because the preclusion in Nobles was not permanent it was not pertinent to Taylor, for the "authority of trial courts to prevent the presentation of a 'half-truth' by ordering further discovery is not at issue here," as it was in Nobles.' 0 8
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Justice Brennan stated that Brown was also inappropriate for the same reasons. 10 9 Justice Brennan found the exclusion of inherently suspect witnesses equally inappropriate." 1 0 Justice Brennan noted that the trial court did not even rely on this in precluding the testimony, but instead included it after the ruling had already been made, 1 1 ' and gave no indication that this ground alone would have been sufficient to exclude the testimony. Sanctions (i) If at any time during the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit the discov-
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gested "that the rule gives a trial judge special authority to exclude criminal defense witnesses based on their apparent or presumed unreliability."116 . Justice Brennan also stated that precluding evidence "based on its presumptive or apparent lack of credibility would be antithetical to the principles laid down" ' 1 7 in Washington, in which the Court asserted that the testimony of witnesses was beneficial to the truth finding process and expressed the opinion that the jury should be left to determine the veracity and weight of such testimony.'", Justice Brennan pointed out that the Washington Court "concluded that 'arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief' are unconstitutional." ' 19 Therefore, in discussing the class of witnesses not identified by defense until trial, "any presumption that they are so suspect that the jury can be prevented from even listening to their testimony is at least as arbitrary as presumptions excluding an accomplice's testimony, hearsay statements bearing indicia of reliability, or a defendant's post-hypnosis testimony-all of which have been declared unconstitutional."' 120 Justice Brennan argued that the proper method to use with such witnesses under the Washington doctrine and Illinois law is to let the jury hear the testimony and then allow "the prosecutor to inform the jury about the circumstances casting doubt on the testimony."12'
Justice Brennan then addressed the punitive objectives and the deterrence of future discovery violations, which the sanction is also intended to accomplish. 122 Instead of preclusion, Justice Brennan argued that direct sanctions such as contempt or disciplinary proery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, exclude such evidence, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. (ii) Willful violation by counsel of an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions by the court. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I1 A, para. 415(g) (Smith-Hurd 1985) . 
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ceedings can be made more proportionate to the severity of the discovery rule violation. 123 In contrast, he said, preclusion can be quite disproportionate 24 and arbitrary. 2 5 Justice Brennan noted that this is particularly true when the defendant is penalized through the exclusion even though he was not personally responsible for the violation.
126
Justice Brennan acknowledged that while it was clear that Taylor's attorney had willfully violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 413(d),1 27 there was no evidence that the defendant had participated in that violation in any way and no investigation into that matter was conducted. 2 8 Instead, Justice Brennan got the "impression that the main reason the trial court excluded Wormley's testimony was the belief that the defense counsel had purposefully lied about when he had located Wormley."' 29 Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted that the trial court excluded the testimony at least partially in response to discovery violations by different defense attorneys in different cases.' 3 0 The Court's response that this would not normally provide proper grounds for exclusion without further application of the analysis to this case was not, injustice Brennan's view, an adequate response to this problem.1 3 1
Justice Brennan proposed that when there exists no evidence of the defendant's involvement in an attorney's willful violation, then a direct sanction against the attorney is "not only fairer but more effective in deterring violations than [would be] excluding defense evidence."' 1 2 Instead, personal sanctions such as "disciplinary proceedings, fines, or imprisonment will likely influence attorney behavior to a far greater extent than the rather indirect penalty 123 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 124 Id: (Brennan,J., dissenting). Preclusion could "result in a defendant charged with a capital offense being convicted and receiving a death sentence he would not have received but for the discovery violation." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) . 125 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Preclusion "might, in another case involving an identical discovery violation, result in a defendant suffering no change in verdict or, if charged with a lesser offense, being convicted and receiving a light or a suspended sentence." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
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threatened by evidentiary exclusion." 13 3
Justice Brennan also made a distinction between tactical errors an attorney makes during the course of a trial and attorney misconduct. 13 4 In doing so, Justice Brennan criticized the Court's determination that because a client is not permitted the power to question all tactical decisions, so too the client cannot question the attorney's decisions regarding violations of discovery rules. 13 5 Justice Brennan defined tactical errors to be those that result from a legitimate choice between different options that, in hindsight, turn out to have been mistakes. 13 6 Justice Brennan admitted that penalizing attorneys for such mistakes would be impractical and futile 3 7 and that with these types of errors the defendant necessarily must be penalized.' 3 8
In contrast, Justice Brennan maintained that attorney misconduct is never the result of a choice between legitimate options and is visible without the aid of hindsight.1 3 9 Because direct punitive sanctions are available against the attorney in such situations, these should be applied exclusively unless the defendant somehow willfully participated in the rule violation. 140 Finally, Justice Brennan argued that the Court's decision created a conflict of interest in that the attorney's best argument against preclusion of the witness in cases of willful misconduct is to argue for personal sanctions against himself.1 4 ' Given such a standard, it is impossible to "expect defense counsel in this or any other case to act as vigorous advocates for the interests of their clients when those interests are adverse to their own." 142 In conclusion, Justice Brennan stated that the Court, in upholding the discovery rules that are meant to assist the criminal system in ascertaining the truth, in fact subverted that ultimate goal of the criminal system by allowing convictions based on an incomplete representation of the facts. 1 43 [Vol. 79
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C. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissCIAing opinion, making it clear that he joined Justice Brennan's dissent only as confined to "general reciprocal-discovery rules"' 144 and not "for any position as to permissible sanctions for noncompliance with rules designed for specific kinds of evidence as, for example, a notice-of-alibi rule."' 4 5
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS In Taylor v. Illinois the Court first held that the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment and not the due process clause of the fifth amendment provided the constitutional basis for a defendant's right to present testimony in his favor. That distinction determines the proper test to be used in establishing when the infringment of the right to present testimony is a violation of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. 14 6 A balancing test of the competing interests involved is used for questions concerning the sixth amendment, whereas a more general fairness standard is used for fifth amendment due process concerns.
14 7
While the Court in Taylor acknowledged the appropriateness of the use of a balancing of interests test, it did not clearly establish or utilize such a test in its determination of whether the preclusion of the defense witness in Taylor was a contitutional violation. Instead, the Court based its decision in Taylor on a willful violation standard that appeared to operate as an exception to the balancing of interests test. 148 The Court's lack of adherance to the analytical framework provided by precedent is unsound and, more importantly, may lead to future violations of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to present a defense.
This Note suggests that a more clearly defined balancing test should be. applied in determining when the preclusion of a defendant's witness as a discovery sanction violates his sixth amendment compulsory process clause rights.
A. COMPULSORY PROCESS VERSUS DUE PROCESS
The holding in Taylor 
1988]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW lor, it was unclear whether the right to present a defense rested solely on the sixth amendment's compulsory process clause or the fifth amendment's due process clause.
Before Taylor, the Supreme Court had decided a number of cases that dealt with the right to present a defense and had determined that a defendant clearly has a constitutionally protected right to present a defense.' 4 9 However, those cases did not clearly establish whether that right was based on the compulsory process clause 15 0 or due process.' 51 In Washington v. Texas, 15 2 the Court held a Texas statute unconstitutional because it arbitrarily prohibited the defendant from offering the testimony of an accomplice.15 3 In so ruling, the Court based its decision on the compulsory process clause, noting that it would be meaningless if the defendant had the right to compel the attendance of witnesses but was powerless to have those witnesses testify. 152 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (arbitrary exclusion of accomplice's testimony held unconstitutional because it violated defendant's sixth amendment right to compel the attendance of witnesses and offer testimony). 153 Id. at 23. 154 Id. at 19, 23 ("The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use.").
155 See Westen, supra note 149, at 117. 156 406 U.S. 605 (1972) . See also United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant's compulsory process rights limited to the physical presence of the witness in the courtroom).
[Vol. 79 852 required defendants to testify in their own defense at the beginning of their case or be precluded from doing so later. 15 7 The parties failed to raise the issue of compulsory process or the Washington decision, and the Court based its decision on the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. 158 The dissent in Brooks demonstrated the shortcomings of both of these arguments. 1 5 9
One commentator has noted that even though the Court was "still vacillating between compulsory process and due process as a ground for its decisions, the Court [had] said and done enough to support the conclusion that it recognize[ed] a comprehensive right of the accused to present a defense through witnesses."' 160 In so doing, the Court referred to compulsory process in dictum 16 1 or in reversing convictions 162 "by reference to Washington 163 and on grounds consistent with a broad view of compulsory process."' 164 The importance of basing the defendant's right to present a defense on the sixth amendment rests in the different tests that have developed for protecting sixth amendment rights as opposed to fifth 159 Id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court ruled that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was violated because the statute penalized him for remaining silent at the beginning of his case. The dissent noted that the defendant never took the stand, so it was difficult to understand how his right to remain silent was infringed upon. Id. at 617 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court also held that the statute violated the defendant's right to counsel because it interfered with his lawyer's "tactical decision" regarding when he should be called to testify. Id. at 612. The dissent noted that counsel was not really prevented from doing anything for his client, but that the defendant's ability to present his own defense was infringed upon. Id. at 618 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160 Westen, supra note 149, at 120. 161 United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 356 (1969). The Supreme Court ruled that, had the government failed to produce certain evidence during Augenblick's court martial, it could have amounted to a denial of compulsory process rights. It was not clear from the record, however, whether this had actually occurred, so the Court ruled that no constitutional question was presented.
162 See, e.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973)(exclusion of defendant's alibi evidence due to his failure to meet the requirements of a notice-of-alibi statute amounted to denial of compulsory process rights); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)(exclusion of testimony under the hearsay rule that was critical to Chambers' defense found to be an unconstitutional infringement upon his right to present a defense); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972)(overturning lower court holding that allowed the jury to ignore testimony for the defense unless it believed the testimony to be true beyond a reasonable doubt as inconsistent with compulsory process rights as established in Washington); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972)(trial judge's intimidation of a defense witness that kept the witness from testifying held to be unconstitutional infringement of defendant's right to offer testimony as expressed in Washington).
165 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 164 Westen, supra note 149, at 120.
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW amendment due process rights. Sixth amendment rights, being specifically guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, are analyzed under a balancing of interests test whereas due process concerns are resolved by general fairness standards. As Justice Brennan discussed in his dissent, the Supreme Court in Rock v. Arkansas 1 6 5 determined, in effect, that a balancing of interests analysis is required in order to uphold an infringement of a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. 16 6 The Court in Rock held that courts "must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to testify."' 1 6 7 In addition, a balancing test was implicit in the Washington decision, in which the Court determined that the state's interest in preventing perjury did not warrant infringing upon the defendant's constitutional right to present testimony because there existed an alternative that adequately protected the state's interest and did not infringe upon the defendant's rights. The Supreme Court in United States v. O'Brien 1 69 held that a balancing test relies on the recognition that constitutional rights are not absolute and there may exist justifications for infringing upon those rights. 170 The balancing test, when properly defined, determines when such infringements are justified.
The interests that should be balanced in evaluating the defendant's right to present a defense were not clearly defined in Taylor, nor had the Court previously established them due to its vacillations between compulsory process and due process as the basis for the right to present a defense. The Supreme Court's previous cases indicate, however, that the relevant interests to be balanced include, on one side, the fundamental nature of the constitutional guarantee to present a defense, 17 1 and the importance of the offered testimony 165 107 S. Ct. 2704 Ct. (1987 . 166 [Vol. 79
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to the defendant's ability to present a defense. 1 7 2 On the other side, the Court should weigh the importance of the state's interest in orderly, fair, and accurate criminal trials' 7 3 as protected by the rules of discovery. 174 This structure without further definition does not, however, provide the appropriate weight courts should give to these various interests. An appropriate way to measure the extent of the government's interests in a balancing of interests analysis is by looking to see if there is a compelling state interest. 17 5 If the state interest is not found to be compelling, then it will never outweigh the defendant's constitutional right. 17 6 If it is found to be compelling,' 7 7 then infringement of fundamental constitutional rights could be allowed if infringement is essential to protecting the compelling state interest.1 7 8 Even if the state interest is compelling, the Court should still determine whether alternative means exist that adequately protect the state's interest but which infringe less upon the defendant's constitutional right. 79 These alternative means do not have to protect the state interest equally well, just so long as they do so "adequately."' 8 0 If such alternatives adequately protect the state interest, then the balance shifts back to protecting the defendant's constitutional right and the infringement should not be allowed. As a result, the infringement should be allowed only if it protects a 172 See id. at 302 (Court was influenced by the fact that the excluded evidence was "critical to Chambers' defense"); Washington, 388 U.S. at 16 (Court was influenced by the fact that the excluded evidence was "vital to the defense"). 
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SUPREME COURT REVIEW compelling state interest and no effective, less infringing alternative exists. In contrast, due process rights are protected by a general fairness approach, sometimes called a totality of the circumstances test, that looks to the facts and circumstances of each case.' 8 1 That less defined standard, therefore, necessarily limits those decisions to particular factual situations, thereby eliminating potentially useful guidelines and reducing a case's precedential value.1812
Justice Stevens' declaration in Taylor that "[t]he right to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amendment"' 1 3 should further aid in resolving the existing confusion over the constitutional basis for the right to offer testimony and present an argument in favor of the compulsory process clause over due process. That declaration would be more encouraging if not for the Court's lack of adherance in Taylor to the balancing of interests analysis that it had previously enunciated.
In deciding Taylor, Justice Stevens outlined, but failed to define and apply, a substantive sixth amendment balancing of interests analysis. In fact, the balancing testJustice Stevens' purported to use was so loosely defined that it is barely distinguishable from the totality of the circumstances test that has been held appropriate for fifth amendment due process rights. 18 4 Furthermore, Justice Stevens based the Court's decision in Taylor on a novel willful violation standard that appears to operate independently of any balancing test and would allow for automatic preclusion when its requirements are met. 185 181 See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) . In ruling on a prosecutorial comment, the Court stated:
When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, this Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly infringes them. But here the claim is only that a prosecutor's remark.., so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. 
Id. See also
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The Court's Balancing Test
Justice Stevens in Taylor appeared to indicate his adoption of a balancing test to be applied in determining the constitutional use of preclusion as a discovery sanction. 1 8 6 Justice Stevens further appeared to have laid a strong analytical framework for establishing a balancing test when he declared that a "trial court may not ignore the fundamental character" 187 of a defendant's compulsory process clause right to present testimony, but at the same time such right could not "automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public interests."' 8 8 The Court listed three public interests to be protected: "the integrity of the adversary process;". "the interest in the fair and efficient administration ofjustice; and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process." 18 9 The Court asserted that all three factors must "weigh in the balance."190 In addition, Justice Stevens also concluded, consistent with the Court's prior balancing of interests analysis, 19 As Justice Brennan's dissent noted, however, the Court failed to finish this analysis in that it never engaged in an in-depth analysis of available alternative sanctions. 193 The Taylor Court's decision was flawed in that it failed to adequately consider the alternatives available to preclusion and their effectiveness in protecting the acknowledged state interest, 194 as previously required for infringing upon a specific Bill of Rights constitutional guarantee, 195 such as the sixth amendment's right to present a defense. Without such an analysis, it was impossible for the Court to properly weigh the necessary protection required by the compelling state interest in orderly trials against the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. In effect, the interests that Justice Stevens himself had noted earlier in the Taylor opinion were never really balanced.
The Court's Willful Standard Test
Despite Justice Stevens' enunciation of a balancing test in Taylor, he actually appeared to disregard the balancing test when he announced a standard that allows for the preclusion of a defense witness as a sanction for a willful discovery violation.' 96 Justice Stevens' disregard of his own balancing test became clear when he determined that a willful violation of a discovery rule intended to either gain a tactical advantage' 9 7 or to conceal fabricated testi-192 108 S. Ct. at 653 ("The State's interest in the orderly conduct of a criminal trial is sufficient to justify the imposition and enforcement of ... rules ... of evidence.").
193
Id. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's consideration of alternative sanctions follows:
It may well be true that alternative sanctions are adequate and appropriate in most cases, but it is equally clear that they would be less effective than the preclusion sanction and that there are instances in which they would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the harm to the adversary process. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. at 655. However, given the Court's holding that the exclusion of presumably fabricated testimony is a goal of discovery, the Court's abrupt analysis of the alternatives is more understandable. If excluding presumably perjured testimony is a primary goal of discovery rules, then alternative sanctions are clearly inadequate because they allow the testimony to be admitted and so could influence the jury. In that respect, no alternative sanction could effectively protect this compelling state interest and the Court would appear justified in ruling that preclusion does not constitutionally violate a defendant's compulsory process clause right to present a defense.
194 20 This inconsistency can be attributed to the emphasis Justice Stevens' placed on evidentiary goals in his opinion in Taylor. 20 2
There are two commonly held justifications for the preclusion of a witness's testimony: the evidentiary justification and the punitive justification. 20 3 The punitive justification relies on the belief that preclusion is the only effective sanction for enforcing a state's discovery rules given the circumstances of a particular case. 20 4 Because that conflict will be decided within the balancing of interests analysis, the punitive justification resolves itself into the balancing test discussed previously because it involves determining the importance of the state's interest in enforcing the discovery rule, the importance of admitting the particular testimony at issue to the defendant's case, and the effectiveness of alternative sanctions. 20 5 the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that imposed preclusion of evidence on the defendant for willfully refusing to comply with an order that required him to produce evidence. 20 8 In deciding this case on due process grounds, the Court held that the willful refusal gave rise to a presumption of "bad faith and untruth" 20 9 and that the failure "was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense." 21 0 Hammond suggests that a violation of discovery rules makes otherwise admissible evidence "presumptively unworthy of belief and the resulting incompetency of the evidence justifies its inadmissibility."-2 1 '
This doctrine was overturned, however, in Washington, when the Supreme Court held unconstitutional on compulsory process grounds a Texas statute that prohibited accomplices from testifying based on the presumption that each would lie for the other. 2 12 The Court ruled that this statute violated the compulsory process clause because it contained "arbitrary rules that prevent[ed] whole categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief." 21 3
As a result, the exclusion of witnesses due to an a priori classification that presumes their testimony to be untrustworthy was held unconstitutional. As Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Taylor, that ruling should be applicable to the Taylor analysis. In Taylor, it seems clear that Justice Stevens relied primarily on an evidentiary justification for allowing preclusion as a discovery sanction. 21 5 Justice Stevens noted that discovery "minimizes the risk that a judgement will be predicated on . . . deliberately
